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1Abstract
We explore the consequences of liberalized credit markets for growth and in-
equality in a lifecycle economy with physical and human capital accumulation,
populated by households of different abilities, and calibrated to match the long-
run economic performance of a panel of emerging countries. Relatively modest
improvements in extending credit to the ablest households appear to have large
economic consequences: upfront costs (slower initial growth, higher income in-
equality) followed by delayed beneﬁts (faster long-run growth). Reform also low-
ers lifecycle utility for a substantial majority of currently active households. Pre-
mature liberalization in theleast developedcountries(low TFP orcapital intensity)
may redirect economic growth towards a poverty trap.
Keywords: Liberalization, credit constraint, poverty trap, human capital, emerg-
ing economies.
JEL classiﬁcation numbers: O410, O160, J240, D310.1 Introduction
Trends toward lesspublicregulation of ﬁnancialmarkets for householddebtareemerg-
ing in different parts of the world. Liberalization of ﬁnancial markets in OECD coun-
tries since the eighties is well documented.1 In less developed countries, ﬁnancial re-
form is more a question of creating lending institutions in order to promote investment
in human and physical capital. Finally, in Eastern Europe, credit to households is now
allowed in some segments of the market, but there is still some way to go.
Behind the slow implementation of reforms and/or the objections raised against lib-
eralized ﬁnancial markets, we ﬁnd the idea that there are upfront costs that may be
deterring. To understand the foundation of these criticisms, we study the medium
and long-term impact of credit reform on the growth and distribution of income in a
lifecycle economy populated by agents who differ in their ability to acquire human
capital.
In this economy, deregulation amounts to an anticipated lifting of all borrowing con-
straints on households. We describe the qualitative and quantitative outcomes of this
ﬁnancial “big bang” on incomes, inequality, and on the welfare of particular social
groups indexed by age and ability. Our starting point is that borrowing limits do not
necessarily ration the poor, as it is assumed in much of the literature (see , e.g., Ga-
lor and Zeira (1993) and Piketty (1997)). They may ration instead the most efﬁcient
accumulators of human skills, that is, households with high potential income growth.
Important clues to the answer we are seeking are identiﬁed in papers by Jappelli and
Pagano (1994), DeGregorio (1996), and DeGregorio andKim (2000), which link market
liberalization to economic growth and distribution.2 We call these clues the level effect
1Examples of this are higher loan-to-value ratios, increased competition between mortgage institu-
tions and banks, and higher borrowing limits on consumers’ personal debt.
2See also Bencivenga and Smith (1991) and Ljungqvist (1993) who stress information and commit-
ment issues in ﬁnancial markets.
2and the growth effect from credit market reforms.
The level effect of ﬁnancial deregulation is strongest in the short-to-medium run. It
reduces net household saving, slows down physical capital accumulation, and raises
yields in societies without human capital. This mechanism was identiﬁed by Jappelli
and Pagano (1994), who found some support for it in a panel of OECD countries. They
conclude that ﬁnancial deregulation in the eighties has contributed to the decline in
national saving and growth rates in the OECD countries.3
Opposed to the level effect is the growth effect, identiﬁed in De Gregorio (1996). It
refers to the rise in borrowing for investments in human skills, and the corresponding
boost to long-run growth in small open societies which rely on human capital as their
growth engine. Evidence for this channel appears to be mixed.
De Gregorio and Kim (2000) also ﬁnd that ﬁnancial reform is welfare improving but
may raise the dispersion of earnings by permitting the more able to specialize in learn-
ing and the less able to specialize in working. As Becker (1964) had suggested, relaxing
constraints on society’s ablest households contributes to earnings inequality.
This paper is based on the assumption that physical and human capital need to be
studied jointly both because they oppose each other and because they interact in subtle
ways. For example, as the level effect raises yields and lowers wage rates, it will under-
mine the growth effect and itself by inducing less schooling by unconstrained people
and greater labor supply. Without a complete general equilibrium model, it seems very
hard to guess how ﬁnancial reform now will affect output in the medium-run as well
as the welfare of each currently living household.
Accordingly, section 2 sets up a simple economy with heterogeneous households, one
3A similar result for LDC’s is obtained by Bandiera, Caprio, Honohan, and Schiantarelli (2000) who
stress that liberalization - and in particular those elements that relax liquidity constraints - may be asso-
ciated with a fall in saving. Norman, Schmidt-Hebbel, and Serven (2000) also ﬁnd that the relaxation of
credit constraints leads to a decrease in the private saving rate.
3consumption good, and two reproducible inputs – physical capital and human capital.
Assuming Cobb-Douglas technology and logarithmic utility, wecharacterize equilibria
with a perfect loan market and with an extreme form of credit rationing, that is, a
prohibition on all loans. We prove in section 3 that the return on capital is always
higher in the economy with perfect markets. The transitional and long-term response
of output and inequality to ﬁnancial reform depends critically on how common credit
rationing was before credit market liberalization.
The remainder of the paper conducts dynamic simulation experiments of ﬁnancial
deregulation in a model calibrated to ﬁt the long-run economic performance of a panel
of less developed countries in the 1960’s. Speciﬁcally, we explore in section 4 the quan-
titative implications for per capita income growth and the Gini coefﬁcients in these
countries. We pay particular attention to the changes in welfare by cohort and abil-
ity group. We ﬁnd that, even when credit constraints initially bind on relatively few
people, the macroeconomic consequences of removing these constraints can be large,
with upfront costs from a lower capital intensity and delayed beneﬁts from long-term
growth. Initial responses to ﬁnancial deregulation are dictated by the adverse level
effect: a decline in the growth of output, coupled with a rise in inequality and in real
yields. The growth effect eventually takes over, boosting long-term growth by about
one third of one percent per year. The impact of liberalization is adverse for all young
households at the time of the reform and also for skilled older people.
The robustness of these results to changes in technology is investigated in section 5.
In particular we show that, with CES technologies and low substitutability between
capital and labor, ﬁnancial reform shrinks the basin of attraction to the higher of the
two balanced growth states. If the economy considered has a low initial capital/labor
ratio, or if its total factor productivity is not high enough, then the lifting of borrowing
constraints that comes from ﬁnancial reform may redirect economic growth towards a
4poverty trap. Section 6 sums up the costs and beneﬁts from ﬁnancial reform and dis-
cusses policies that would make liberalization more agreeable to a majority of house-
holds.
2 The model
The model is an overlapping generations model in the spirit of Azariadis and Drazen
(1990), extending their approach to heterogeneous households and imperfect credit
markets. Time is discrete and goes from 0 to +∞. Each generation consists in a contin-
uum of households, with mass expanding at a constant rate n > −1.
Each individual lives for two periods, youth and old age. The households of the same
generation differ in their innate ability to work when young, ε
Y, and when old, ε
O. Their
utility function is deﬁned over consumption when adult ct and consumption when old
dt+1:
lnct + βlndt+1, β ∈ R+.
A share of time λt is spent to build up human capital and 1 − λt to work. First-period
income is allocated between consumption and savings st:
ε
Y(1 − λt)wt¯ ht = ct + st. (1)
The individual variables ct, st, λt and dt+1 will generally depend on ability. Economy-
wide variables are wt, the wage per unit of human capital, and ¯ ht which denotes the
average human capital of the old generation at time t. The endowment of efﬁcient
labor when young is ε
Y¯ ht. Following Azariadis and Drazen (1990), each young person
beneﬁts from the average human capital of the previous generation. Old age human
capital depends on the time spent on education when young, on the ability when old
5ε
O, and on the average value of the previous generation’s human capital:
ht+1 = ε
Oψ(λt)¯ ht. (2)
We think of ¯ ht as a measure of teacher quality. As we can see from equation (2), the
individual characteristic ε
O reﬂects both the ability to work when old and the ability
to learn (i.e. to accumulate human capital). The function ψ is assumed increasing,
concave and satisﬁes boundary conditions
lim
λ→0
ψ (λ)=+ ∞, lim
λ→1
ψ (λ)=0, (3)
which ensure that it is always optimal to spend a strictly positive time span building
human capital.
The ability type (ε
Y,ε
O) is distributed over each generation according to a cumulative
function G deﬁned on R2









Old agents consume both labor earnings and capital income:
dt+1 = Rt+1st + wt+1ht+1. (4)
Rt+1 is the interest factor.





From equations (1), (2) and (4), lifecycle income is proportional to the inherited human
6capital ¯ ht:
Ωt = wt [ε
Y(1 − λt)+xtε
Oψ(λt)] ¯ ht.
2.1 Perfect markets equilibrium
Since the duration of schooling λt does not enter the utility function, we can solve the
household planning problem in two separate steps. The optimal length of schooling






This equation represents the trade-off between studying and working put forward by
Ben-Porath (1967). This relationship implies that the length of schooling depends pos-
itively on discounted future wage (the beneﬁt from education) and negatively on cur-
rent wage (the opportunity cost). It also depends positively on the ratio of innate abil-
ities ε
O/ε
Y. Inverting equation (5) we obtain:
λt = ϕ(ε
Oxt/ε
Y), ϕ  > 0, ϕ(0)=0.
The average human capital of the next period grows at the rate gp(xt), where:
¯ ht+1
¯ ht











Optimal savings are computed by maximizing utility subject to the budget constraints
(1) and (4):
(1 + β)st =
 
βε











ψ(ϕ(a)) Φ  > 0. (8)
This allows us to rewrite savings as:
(1 + β)st = βwtε
Y (1 − Φ(ε
Oxt/ε
Y)) ¯ ht. (9)
Note that there is a threshold ˜ µ bearing on relative ability ε
O/ε
Y above which house-
holds borrow from ﬁnancial markets. Indeed, we note from equations (5) and (7) that
savings are positive if, and only if, βε
Y(1 −λt)ψ (λt) > ε
Oψ(λt).A sψ(.) is increasing in
the interval (0,1) and ψ (λt)(1−λt) is decreasing in λt, this inequality deﬁnes a critical
value for schooling, ˜ λ, independent of time and such that:
λt < ˜ λ ⇔ st > 0.
Since λt is a monotone function ϕ(.) of ability, we can deﬁne the ability threshold as a








This threshold again separates borrowers from lenders, that is,
ε
O
εY < ˜ µt ⇔ st > 0.
Hence, households in cohort t with relative ability above ˜ µt (or, equivalently, with
steeply rising wage proﬁles) will borrow while other households will lend.
To characterize the equilibrium we equate aggregate saving with the value of the cap-
























We assume that ﬁrms operate a constant return to scale technology F(Kt, Ht) involving
capital and labor inputs. Deﬁning the capital – labor ratio as kt = Kt/Ht, and an
intensive production function f(kt), equilibrium factor prices are:
wt = f(kt) − kt f  (kt)=ω(kt),
Rt = f  (kt)=R(kt).





The total labor supply per young person Ht is obtained by averaging over young and
old workers, that is,
Ht = Hp(xt)¯ ht. (13)















9Equilibrium in the ﬁnancial market requires:













Given initial conditions (k0, ¯ h0), a perfect foresight equilibrium can be characterized
by a non-negative sequence (xt,kt+1, ¯ ht+1)t≥0 which solves equations (6), (12) and (14).
This dynamical system can be solved recursively when the production function is
Cobb-Douglas, f(kt)=Akα























This equation is analyzed further immediately below.
2.2 Equilibrium with credit rationing
We deﬁne an imperfect credit market as an environment in which young households
cannot credibly commit their future labor income as a collateral against current loans.
As in Kehoe and Levine (1993), we assume that individuals are allowed to borrow up
to the point where they are indifferent between repaying loans and suffering market
exclusion. Since everyone dies at the end of the second period, default involves no
10penalty and is individually optimal. The borrowing constraint then takes a very simple
form: st ≥ 0.4
We saw in the previous subsection that the households with ability ratio ε
O/ε
Y above
the threshold ˜ µt = B/xt borrow from ﬁnancial markets. Those households will now
be rationed. They will not participate to the credit market, maximizing instead an
autarkic utility function of the form:
ln(1 − λt)+βln(ψ(λt)) +constants.
The ﬁrst order condition is:
ψ(λt)=βψ (λt)(1 − λt).
Since ψ(.) is increasing in the interval (0,1) and ψ (λt)(1 − λt) is decreasing in λt, this
equation deﬁnes a unique solution ˜ λ, which does not depend on prices, nor on ability
type. It is the same as the threshold ˜ λ deﬁned in the previous section.
We can now summarize our results in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Households whose ability proﬁles do not rise fast, i.e. ε
O/ε
Y < ˜ µt, save a
positive amount given by equation (9); their investment in education λt equals ϕ(ε
Oxt/ε
Y) and
depends positively on ε
O/ε
Y. Households with fast rising ability proﬁles, i.e. ε
O/ε
Y > ˜ µt,a r e
credit rationed, and invest the same amount in education, i.e. λt = ˜ λ = ϕ( ˜ µtxt).
Households with a steep potential earnings proﬁle would like to borrow in order to
study longer, but credit rationing prevents then from doing so. All others have pos-
itive saving and study as long as they wish. Note that the threshold ˜ µt depends on
4A related formulation, due to Jappelli and Pagano (1994), would be to permit borrowing up to
a “natural” debt limit which amounts to a ﬁxed, and typically small, fraction of the present value of
future income.
11prices through equation (10). For example, when yields are high, there will be fewer
constrained households, other things being equal. Hence, although our borrowing
constraint is very simple, the proportion of rationed people dependson pricesand hence varies
over time.
Inthepresenceofrationing, theaveragehumancapital grows atarate gc(xt)=¯ ht+1/¯ ht −








































instead of the expression in equation (11). Similarly, average labor supply no longer
satisﬁes equation (13); it is given instead by:
Ht = Hc(xt)¯ ht

























Labor supply is decreasing in xt, that is, H 
c(.) < 0, since better earnings prospects









Given the initial conditions (k0, ¯ h0), a perfect foresight equilibrium with credit ra-
tioning is again a sequence (xt,kt+1, ¯ ht+1)t≥0 which solves equations (15), (12) and (16).














This system is recursive. Equation (17) can ﬁrst be solved for the path of xt. Equation
(18) is obtained from the deﬁnition of xt in equation (12); it describes the evolution of
the capital-labor ratio. The growth rate of human capital is obtained from (15). The
solution to (15)-(17)-(18) is summed up in the following result.
Proposition 2 The system (15)-(17)-(18) has a steady state (xc,kc, gc) and equilibrium is
unique in the neighborhood of that state.
Proof: See appendix. Q.E.D.
Thesamereasoning canbeappliedto theperfect marketeconomy whichalso possesses
a locally unique equilibrium in the neighborhood of the steady state (xp,kp, gp).
3 Interacting level and growth effects
As a general proposition, it is impossible to show that ﬁnancial reform will spread in-
equality and promote long-term growth. For example, liberalization raises yields (see
13proposition 3 below) and improves the income of retirees. Since this effect is stronger
for less able retirees with relatively high saving, it tends to reduce inequality. What
happens to long-term growth depends on how young households weigh the mixed
incentives they receive in free ﬁnancial markets: less credit rationing permits them
to invest more in schooling while higher yields on physical capital shrink the present
value of future earnings. We ﬁrst state a key result according to which ﬁnancial reform
reduces aggregate saving and raises yields.
Proposition 3 Assuming a unique steady state, the economy with perfect markets has a lower
long-run capital-labor ratio than the one with imperfect markets.
Proof: See appendix. Q.E.D.
To assess the effect of ﬁnancial reform on the long-run growth rate of per capita output
(which equals the long-run growth rate of average human capital), we should compare
the perfect market growth rate, gp(xp), with the credit-rationed growth rate, gc(xc).
Two opposite effects interact: for the same long-run yield 1/x, gp(x) > gc(x). Indeed,
some agents are constrained in the imperfect market economy, invest less than they
want in education and growth is slower. However, as the yield is higher in the perfect
market economy (xp < xc), agents are discouraged from investing in education, and
this may or may not outweigh the direct positive effect. The ﬁrst effect will dominate
if there are enough constrained agents in the economy with imperfect markets.
What happens to the short-run growth rate of output depends on the interaction of
several factors. First,
the forward-looking relative wage x drops when the reform is announced, and invest-
ment in physical capital starts to fall immediately which is bad for short-term growth
(level effect). Second, the lifting of the borrowing constraints permits more investment
14in education, which is good for growth (growth effect). Third, the supply of labor
moves in opposite direction from investment in education, which depresses short-run
growth. Last, there are additional dynamic effects when the reform is anticipated. To
assess the relative importance of these mechanisms, we must rely on simulations.
4 Dynamic simulations
In the previous section we established that ﬁnancial reforms which relax the borrow-
ing constraints on households will lower the capital/labor ratio and improve growth
in the long-run if the number of constrained households is sufﬁciently high. However,
the transitional impact of these reforms is less clearcut and hard to characterize ana-
lytically. In order to study the interplay of long-run and medium-run forces along the
transition path, we will rely on simulations of a calibrated version of the model. This
will also allow us to assess the quantitative importance of liberalization for growth and
inequality.
4.1 Calibration
We ﬁrst choose functional forms for the production function of human capital and the
distribution of abilities. The production of human capital has to satisfy the two limit








The abilities index (ε
Y,ε
O) is assumed to be distributed over the population according
15to a bivariate lognormal distribution; the mean5 and variance-covariance matrix of the
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Since we have no direct information to calibrate the variance-covariance matrix we
carry out a sensitivity analysis of the correlation   between the two ability variables
and of their relative variance σ2
Y/σ2
O. The scope of the analysis will be restricted by
assuming a positive correlation,   > 0. It also seems reasonable to assume that the
ability to work when young is less widely dispersed than the ability to work when old.
Indeed, ability in youth only reﬂects different endowments in efﬁcient labor, while
ability in old age also embodied the ability to accumulate human capital. We thus
assume σ2
Y/σ2
O < 1. Keeping this ratio constant, the absolute magnitude of the two
variances will be chosen to match an income inequality coefﬁcient (see below).
The productivity parameter of the Cobb-Douglas production function A plays no role
given that the utility is logarithmic; it only scales the output and capital levels. The
capital share parameter α is ﬁxed to 1/3 according to the consensus in the literature.
The psychological discount factor of households is set to 1% per quarter. Assuming
that one period of the model is 25 years, we have: β = 0.99100 = 0.366.
For ﬁxed   and σ2
Y/σ2
O there are four remaining parameters to calibrate: the growth
rate of population n is directly observable; the productivity parameter b governs the
long-term growth rate of output per capita; given b, the parameter γ determines the
time spent on education in the ﬁrst period of life; ﬁnally, the variance parameter σ2
O in-
ﬂuences the distribution of income. We chose these parameters so that the steady state
of the equilibrium with credit rationing matches some moments of a typical economy
5The mean can be normalized without loss of generality.
16with imperfect credit markets. This representative economy is obtained from aver-
aging eight economies considered by Bandiera, Caprio, Honohan, and Schiantarelli
(2000) as having strongly imperfect credit markets in the sixties. These are Chile,
Ghana, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Turkey and Zimbabwe.
The averagegrowth rate of population andoutput is computed over the period 1960-70
using the GDP data of the Penn World Tables. For the share of time devoted to educa-
tion we assume that the ﬁrst period of the model covers ages 12-37 and the second one
corresponds to ages 37-62. Doing so supposes that secondary and higher education
are an alternative to working, but elementary education is not. The percentage of time
devoted to schooling is therefore computed by adding the variables ”average years of
secondary schooling in the total population” and ”average years of higher schooling in
the total population” from Barro-Lee and dividing them by 25. Finally, we summarize
the distribution of income by a Gini index from Deininger and Squire (1996).6
These computations lead to the following four moments: an annual growth rate of
population of 2.73%, a long-term per capita growth rate of 2.903% per year, a Gini
coefﬁcient of 0.458 and a share of time devoted to education of 2.901%. The value of
n matching the growth rate of population is n = 0.962. The value of the other three
parameters depend on the assumptions on   and σ2
Y/σ2
O.
Appendix A.4 gives the variance σ2
O which matches the Gini coefﬁcient for different
combinations of   and σ2
Y/σ2
O. The parameters b and γ are picked to match output











6Where possible, the Gini coefﬁcients are from 1970, otherwise we used the closest available year.




and the annual rate of return on capital,
25  
1/xc − 1.
Wedrawthree conclusions from this sensitivity analysis. First, the percentageofhouse-
holds subject to a borrowing constraint is never large, and reaches at maximum 19%.
Second, when the correlation between the two random ability indexes is large, few
people are constrained: in that case relative ability ε
O/ε
Y displays little variation across
households and few people want to borrow. Third, the saving rate lies between 8.8%
and 9.8%7 and the annual rate of return on capital is around 11.2%, whatever variance-
covariance matrix we pick.
In order to choose a reasonable variance-covariance matrix Σ, we look at the charac-
teristics of the distribution of income for different parameters values. Appendix A.5
reports income Gini indexes per cohort and the ratio of the mean to the median of
the earnings distribution. We chose to use in the sequel   = 0.2 and σ2
Y/σ2
O = 0.8.
A correlation of 0.2 seems reasonable given a span of 25 years between the two abil-
ity shocks, and the fact that ε
O incorporates the ability to learn while ε
Y does not. A
relative variance of 0.8 reproduces a ratio of Gini indexes of 0.42/0.53=0.79 which is
close to US data (see Diaz-Gimenez, Quadrini, and Rios Rull (1997)). Figure 1 plots the
corresponding density function of abilities. The vertical plane represents the thresh-
old above which people are rationed. Constrained households lie on the left side of
the picture and represent 15.5 % of the population; they are those with a high income
7This lies below the average saving rate of 15.49% computed from the data of Bandiera, Caprio,
Honohan, and Schiantarelli (2000) but seems still acceptable.
18growth potential (either low ε
Y or high ε
O).
[Figure 1 about here.]
4.2 Response to reform
We now simulate the transition from a steady state with credit rationing to the one in
the perfect market economy. The relaxation of the borrowing constraints takes place at
time t = 3 and is anticipated one period in advance. Time t = 1 represents the initial
steady state with credit constraints. Figure 2 represents the dynamic path of the three
key variables, (xt, kt and g
y
t), that is, relative wage, capital/labor ratio and growth rate
in per capita income. When liberalization is announced, the relative wage xt looks
forward; it jumps close to the steady state level that will be reached at the time of the
reform. This makes future wages less attractive, and discourages investment in human
capital at t = 2.
Because xt is also the investment rate, the capital-labor ratio kt starts declining at t = 3.
The saving rate drops by half a percent. This decline in the stock of capital is key in
explaining the drop in the annual growth rate at t = 3 from 2.9% to 2.7% over 25 years.
[Figure 2 about here.]
At t = 3 the ablest households are now allowed to borrow, increasing their investment
in education and lengthening average schooling from 2.9% to 3.6%. This is not very
large but it is sufﬁcient to drive growth above its initial level by by about 0.15 percent.
A sensitivity analysis of this magnitude to the chosen values of ρ and σ2
Y/σ2
O is pre-
sented in appendix A.6: the gain is between 0 and 0.30 percent, and depends on the
percentage of constrained households in the initial balanced growth path.
19What might have happened if we had calibrated on the same set of economies for a
different time period, or on an altogether different set of emerging economies? To see
how our outcomes are sensitive to parameters, we summarize in table 1 the response
of constraints, saving rates, and growth rates as the parameter structure changes rela-
tive to the baseline calibration. We conclude that the increase in long-term growth is
largest in economies with high schooling and slow population growth, and smallest in
economies with high capital share and low initial inequality. Changes typically show
weak sensitivity to any single parameter and are almost completely insensitive to the
pre-reform growth rate.
[Table 1 about here.]
4.3 The cost of liberalization
[Figure 3 about here.]
To better grasp the cost of this ﬁnancial reform, Figure 3 plots both the Gini coefﬁcient
and the difference between the GDP the economy would have enjoyed without reform
and the one with the reform. Inequality peaks at t = 3 before stabilizing above its
pre-reform level. The long-run effect is essentially explained by the fact that the ablest
people can now fully exploit their advantage by going to school longer, implying that
old able persons are much richer in the perfect market economy than in the credit
constrained one.
The loss of output linked to the fall in physical capital also peaks at t = 3. It is around
5% at the time the reform. It takes three periods to catch-up and then overtake the level
without reform.
20Even though only 15.5% of the population was constrained in the initial state of the
economy, ﬁnancial reform leads to signiﬁcant effects, both in the medium-run and in
the long-run. We conclude that borrowing constraints may have a major impact on
economic growth and inequality even if they affect a small fraction of households,
provided that those include individuals with high income growth potential.
4.4 Losers and gainers
[Figure 4 about here.]
Gains from ﬁnancial reform are displayed in Figure 4 which describes the increment in
life-cycle utility for members of different cohorts as a function of their abilities. Recall
that the reform reduces the wage per unit of human capital from t = 3 onwards and
rises yields.
Looking ﬁrst at the generations alive at the time of the liberalization, we can identify
two two gainers:
1. The cohort born at t = 2 (old at t = 3) with low relative ability ε
O/ε
Y loses almost
nothing in wages but do gain from the higher interest rate at t = 3; cf. the right
side of panel (a).
2. The cohort born at t = 3 with high relative ability ε
O/ε
Y gains from the lifting of
the borrowing constraints; cf. the left side of panel (b).
On the contrary, a huge majority of young households born at t = 3 (cf. right side
of panel (b)) loses from liberalization, primarily because of lower wages per unit of
human capital. Since in our model economy there is 1.962 young households for each
old one, 32%of thetotal population living at t = 3 gains ([1.962×11+74]/2.962 = 32).
21Looking now at future generations, one out of two children of the generation born in
t = 4 gain, essentially because they will beneﬁt from the increase in GDP in their old
days (see panel (c)). One hundred percent of the grand-children gain (see panel (d)).
5 Reforms and poverty traps
Forty years ago, Arrow, Chenery, Minhas, and Solow (1961) taught us that economic
analysis based on a unitary elasticity of substitution between labor and capital often
leads to unduly restrictive conclusions. For example, estimates for developed coun-
tries consistently ﬁnd that the elasticity of substitution is not different from unity, but
much lower values have been found for LDC’s.8 This may reﬂect more limited tech-
nological options in emerging economies, i.e., entrepreneurs choosing from the set of
technologies in current or local use rather than on the broader set of all potential tech-
nologies.
In our speciﬁc context, we have two reasons to believe that lower substitution between
production factors might affect the adjustment to ﬁnancial reforms. First, it makes
factor prices more sensitive to changes in the capital-labor ratio. Liberalization is thus
expected to increase yields in a stronger way and to diminish the growth effect from
human capital accumulation.
Second, CES technologies are consistent with poverty traps in the basic overlapping
generations model (Azariadis 1996). If the initial capital/labor ratio is low enough, the
economy will converge to the trivial steady state with zero capital instead of the one
with high capital/labor ratio. In our set-up, ﬁnancial reform tends to lower national saving
and shrink the basin of attraction of the higher steady state. As a result, more development
8For example, Sosin and Fairchild (1984) ﬁnd an average elasticity of 1/2 using a sample of 221 Latin
American ﬁrms in the seventies.
22paths will converge to the poverty trap. This is a powerful argument against reform:
if the economy considered has an initial capital/labor ratio close to the region that
leads to the poverty trap, the lifting of borrowing constraints that comes from ﬁnancial
reform may drive the economy out of the attraction basin of the high steady state.
5.1 Liberalization and the effect on yields





ν + 1 − α
  ν
ν−1
with parameters ν, A > 0 and α ∈ (0,1). We set the elasticity of substitution ν equal to
1/2, which we regard as a lower bound on the actual elasticity. To better assess the role
of the low elasticity of substitution, the parameters b, σ2, β and γ keep the same value
as in the Cobb-Douglas case. We adjust the parameters A and α in order to obtain a
high steady state as close as possible to the previous case both in terms of growth rate
and capital share in production. With A = 53.5 and α = 0.425, weobtain a steady state
with imperfect market displaying the same growth and capital share as previously. All
the other variables are very close to their level in the Cobb-Douglas case, and 15.8% of
young households face borrowing constraints.
[Figure 5 about here.]
[Figure 6 about here.]
Figures 5 and 6 display the response to ﬁnancial reform that follows the same timing
as in the Cobb-Douglas case, i.e., the reform is announced at t = 2 and takes place
at t = 3. Compared to Figures 2 and 3, we ﬁnd three differences. First, as expected,
23the effect on yields is stronger: the return on capital rises from 11% to 11.7% instead
of going from 11% to 11.5% as it did in the Cobb-Douglas case. Second, the drop in
output at t = 3 is almost of the same magnitude as previously, but the long-run gain is
lower. Third, the gains from the reform take more time to materialize: GDP takes four
periods instead of three to catch-up. As a consequence of the weaker growth effect,
the long-term gains are much more modest; after 7 periods, GDP is 4% greater than it
would be without reform, instead of 10% in the Cobb-Douglas case.
5.2 The perils of premature liberalization
[Figure 7 about here.]
To evaluate more fully how ﬁnancial reform alters the course of an emerging econ-
omy, we need to understand the global dynamics of an economy with credit rationing.
This economy is described by equations (12) and (16) which lead to the phase diagram
shown in Figure 7. The phaselines kt+1 = kt and xt+1 = xt and the corresponding di-
rection of motions are derived in appendix. Depending on parameter values, the two
phaselines may or may not intersect. Figure 7 represents the typical case where there
are three steady states; point S1 is a source and points S0 and S2 are saddles. If initial
capital is below k1, the equilibrium will converge to the trivial steady state S0 in which
there is no production. If it is above, the equilibrium converges to S2. Saddle-paths are
indicated by bold lines.
Credit market reform does not modify the position of the phaseline kt+1 = kt. Using
the same arguments as in proposition 2, one can show that reforms moves the phase-
line xt+1 = xt downward. Two situations may arise, depending on whether there is
a positive steady state under a perfect credit market. This will depend crucially on
values of the total factor productivity A and of the rate of time preference.
24[Figure 8 about here.]
The bifurcation diagram in ﬁgure 8 shows how the existence of steady states and their
stability characteristics are sensitive to the value of the total factor productivity A. The
annualized capital yield R(k) is on the vertical axis, and total factor productivity on
the horizontal one. All other parameters are set at their calibrated values of the pre-
vious sub-section. Reading the chart from bottom to top, the solid line indicates the
saddlepoint-stable steady state of the economy with rationing. The dashed line above
gives the corresponding saddlepoint-stable steady state of the economy with perfect
credit market. The vertical distance between the two lines measures the increase in the
long-run return on capital caused by the ﬁnancial reform at each value of total factor
productivity.
Dotted lines represent the unstable steady state of the economy with rationing (top)
andwithout rationing (bottom) respectively. These linesalso deﬁnetheattraction basin
of the stable steady state: if the economy starts with an initial return R(k0) outside that
basin, then equilibrium will converge to the poverty steady state, and R(kt converges
to the solid line f (0). The vertical distance between the two dotted lines measures
how much the attraction basin shrinks after the liberalization.
This diagram sums up the economy’s response to ﬁnancial reform in four different
regions:
Zone 1: For A > 40 (corresponding to a no-liberalization annualgrowth rate gy > 2.62)
liberalization affects the unstable steady state and the attraction basin very little. This
is because yields are high at the unstable steady state, and very few agents (less than
1%) are credit rationed there.
Zone 2: For 40 > A > 35.718 (2.62 > gy > 2.34), liberalization shrinks the basin of
attraction a bit more. If reform occurs when the economy is close to the low steady
25state, then liberalization will drive the equilibrium into the poverty trap.
Zone 3: For 35.718 > A > 35.1579 (2.34 > gy > 2.17), there is no steady state for the
economy with complete markets. In this case, liberalization will lead the economy into
the poverty trap for any initial value of the capital-labor ratio.
Zone 4: For A < 35.1579, there is no positive steady state. The economy will converge
to the poverty trap with or without reform.
The third zone describes a “premature” liberalization. An economy with a total factor
productivity in this range should ﬁrst build up its TFP by promoting structural mi-
croeconomic reforms before attempting ﬁnancial reform. Note that this range does not
correspond to totally unreasonable values of the endogenous variables. For example,
with A = 35.4, the steady state with imperfect markets has a return rate on capital of
14.5%, a capital share in output of 60%, and a growth rate of 2.28%.
6 Conclusions and policy implications
Here is a review of our conclusions about the medium and long-run consequences of
ﬁnancial reform, followed by some thoughts on redistributive policies that spread the
beneﬁts of liberalization more evenly among different age and ability groups.
6.1 Costs and beneﬁts
Financial reform in this paper amounts to abolishing credit constraints on the most ef-
ﬁcient human capital accumulators of an emerging economy. Calibrating the model to
match the long-run operating characteristics (schooling, growth rate, income distribu-
tion) of a panel of eight economies in the sixties, we ﬁnd that reform:
261. Eases constraints on individuals with rising lifetime ability proﬁles (15% of the
population), accelerating long-term growth by about 0.15 percent per year.
2. Reducesthe household saving rate permanently, andlowers the GDP growth rate
temporarily by 0.3% per year, relative to the no-reform path. Post-reform output
does not recover fully until several periods later, when the impact of higher skills
overcomes the weakness of aggregate savings.
3. Raises income inequality by a permanent margin.
4. Lowers the lifecycle utility of nine out of ten people aged 12-37 at the time of
reform as well as the ablest 25% among the older group aged 37-62. Without
some type of compensation scheme, the losers from reform represent about two-
third of all economically active households.
5. Improves the welfare of half the generation born at the time of the reform and of
all members in all cohorts born later.
6. May permanently change for the worse the growth path of least developed econ-
omies, if it occurs prematurely, that is, before total factor productivity becomes
large enough. In particular, if the capital-labor elasticity of substitution is near
1/2, and physical capital and factor productivity are both low enough to drive
the annualized net yield on capital up to 15%-17%, then a ﬁnancial reform of the
type we consider here alters the course of economic growth permanently. Instead
of converging to its pre-reform steady state yield of 14%-15%, the post-reform
economy is diverted to a poverty trap with an annualized capital yield of nearly
19%.
Even if we ignore the increased potential for a poverty trap, most rational households
in the economy we describe would object to ﬁnancial reform as we deﬁned it. It comes
27as no surprise to us that opposition to less regulation and more competition in ﬁnan-
cial markets is so strong in actual economies; we are rather intrigued by the observa-
tion that majorities occasionally agree to reforms. Arguments in favor of reform are
that altruism sways people to reckon the beneﬁts that accrue to their descendants, and
transfers from gainers persuade the losers to drop their objections.
6.2 Compensating the losers
The timing of gains and losses suggests that public debt is one device which may allow
all generations to share the gains from reform. In particular suppose that the govern-
ment pays subsidies to currently active households, by issuing public debt which will
be repayed slowly by taxing future generations.
Public debt will typically crowd out capital, amplifying the adverse level effect of the
reform in the medium-run and undermining the favorable long-run growth effect.
How to strike the right balance between medium-term redistribution and long-term
incentives is an open issue for economic policy.
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30A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof: To prove this result we show that the there is asteady state in thedynamics of xt
given by equation (17), and that it is locally unstable. If this is true, the only possibility
consistent with the existence of anequilibrium with perfect foresight is for the forward-
looking variable xt to be at steady state x for all t ≥ 0. Given that xt = xc ∀t, the
dynamics of kt given by (18) converge monotonically to the steady state.
Equation (17) can be written
J(xt+1)=H(xt).














H(0)=+ ∞ > H(∞)=0
Given that H(0) > J(0) and H(∞) < J(∞), there is a steady state x such that J(x)=
H(x). The local instability of x is guaranteed by −H /J  > 1. Q.E.D.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof: To compare the steady states in the two economies we deﬁne the functions
T(x,i)=( 1 + n)
(1 + β)α
(1 − α)β
   ∞
0






























































31The steady state xp of the perfect market economy is characterized by T(xp, ∞)=
W(xp, ∞). The one of the economy with credit rationing xc is given by T(xc, B/xc)=
W(xc, B/xc).
The function T is increasing in both of its arguments. To evaluate the sign of the deriva-



















































which is increasing in x for ﬁxed i and increasing in i for ﬁxed x. We deduce that the
function W is decreasing in both of its arguments.
Hence the condition T(x,i) −W(x,i)=0 deﬁnes an implicit function
x = Q(i) with Q  < 0.
Since i is inﬁnite in the perfect market case and ﬁnite in the imperfect case, we obtain
that xp < xc. Using (18) which holds for both economies, we obtain that the capi-
tal/labor ratio is lower in the perfect market economy. Q.E.D.
A.3 Phase diagram





describes an implicit function
kt+1 = Γ(kt, xt), Γk > 0, Γx > 0,
32which is increasing in eachargument. Note also that Γ(0,x) > 0 for any x > 0, because,
for any CES production function with ν < 1, R(k) is bounded from above.
The locus of points where kt+1 = kt is deﬁned by xt = 1/R(kt), which is increasing and
has a positive intercept 1/f (0) for an elasticity of substitution ν < 1. Above this line
kt+1 > kt because Γ is increasing in xt.
The second relationship xt+1 = Ψ(kt, xt) is derived from equation (16) where kt+1 has







(1 + n)Γ(kt, xt)
. (19)
The LHS of this relation is decreasing in xt+1 while the RHS is decreasing in xt. Fur-
thermore, for any elasticity of substitution ν < 1, one can show that ω(k)/Γ(k, x) is
increasing in k for each ﬁxed x. It follows that the function Ψ(k, x) is decreasing in k
and increasing in x:
xt+1 = Ψ(kt, xt), Ψk < 0, Ψx > 0.
The locus of points where xt+1 = xt deﬁned by xt = Ψ(kt, xt) has a zero intercept:
for any x > 0, the fact that Γ(0,x) > 0 implies that x = 0 is the only solution to the
equation x = Ψ(0,x). Furthermore, repeating the arguments in the proof of Propo-
sition 2, we can show that Ψx(k, x) > 1 for each ﬁxed k. In addition, the equation
x = limk→∞ Ψ(k, x) has a bounded solution in x. Therefore, the phaseline xt+1 = xt is
upward sloped, starting below the phaseline kt+1 = kt at kt = 0, and ending below it
as kt → ∞.
33A.4 Sensitivity analysis with respect to Σ





  0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.0 1.45 1.07 0.88 0.74 0.64
0.2 1.44 1.09 0.89 0.74 0.65
0.4 1.44 1.09 0.90 0.76 0.65
0.6 1.44 1.11 0.90 0.77 0.68
0.8 1.42 1.11 0.92 0.78 0.69




  0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.0 14.2 15.8 17.2 18.1 18.8
0.2 12.4 13.6 14.6 15.6 16.3
0.4 10.3 10.8 11.6 12.4 13.1
0.6 8.0 7.6 7.7 8.3 8.9





  0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.0 9.4 9.6 9.7 9.8 9.8
0.2 9.3 9.4 9.5 9.6 9.7
0.4 9.1 9.3 9.4 9.5 9.6
0.6 9.0 9.1 9.2 9.4 9.5
0.8 8.8 8.9 9.1 9.2 9.4




  0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.0 11.2 11.1 11.1 11.0 11.0
0.2 11.3 11.2 11.1 11.1 11.0
0.4 11.3 11.3 11.2 11.2 11.1
0.6 11.4 11.3 11.3 11.2 11.2
0.8 11.5 11.4 11.4 11.3 11.2
35A.5 Income distribution as a function of Σ




  0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.0 1.29 1.37 1.40 1.41 1.42
0.2 1.30 1.35 1.39 1.43 1.42
0.4 1.30 1.36 1.40 1.40 1.44
0.6 1.29 1.37 1.41 1.43 1.42
0.8 1.28 1.36 1.40 1.43 1.44




  0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.0 0.30 0.36 0.40 0.42 0.43
0.2 0.30 0.36 0.40 0.42 0.44
0.4 0.30 0.36 0.40 0.42 0.44
0.6 0.29 0.36 0.40 0.43 0.43
0.8 0.29 0.36 0.40 0.42 0.45




  0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.0 0.70 0.62 0.57 0.52 0.49
0.2 0.69 0.62 0.56 0.53 0.49
0.4 0.70 0.62 0.56 0.53 0.49
0.6 0.71 0.62 0.57 0.52 0.48
0.8 0.71 0.62 0.56 0.52 0.47
A.6 Growth effect as a function of Σ




  0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.0 3.30 3.19 3.15 3.11 3.09
0.2 3.25 3.12 3.09 3.05 3.02
0.4 3.19 3.08 3.04 3.02 3.00
0.6 3.13 3.01 2.98 2.96 2.95
0.8 3.06 2.94 2.92 2.91 2.91
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Figure 1: The distribution of abilities and rationed households


















































Figure 2: Dynamic responses to reform
















Figure 3: Costs of liberalization
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Figure 4: Gains in lifecycle utility by cohorts























Figure 5: Dynamic responses to reform - CES case











































Figure 7: Phase diagram – CES case












Figure 8: Bifurcation diagram for ﬁnancial reforms
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47γ B σ2
O % constr. saving drop in gain in
rate saving r. growth
Baseline case 0.234 0.739 0.74 15.5 9.6 -0.5 + 0.15
More schooling 0.456 2.694 0.67 18.8 9.5 -0.6 +0.27
(5% instead of 2.9%)
Slower popul. growth 0.210 0.619 0.74 18.0 8.5 -0.5 +0.17
(1.6% instead of 2.9%)
Higher capital share 0.370 1.982 0.67 8.2 8.1 -0.2 +0.08
(α = 1/2)
Less inequality 0.232 0.877 0.41 10.5 8.8 -0.3 + 0.07
(Gini=0.35)
Less output growth 0.234 0.523 0.75 15.6 9.6 -0.5 +0.15
(1.5% instead of 2.9%)
More patience 0.152 0.359 0.77 12.1 14.0 -0.5 +0.08
(β = .995100)
Table 1: Sensitivity analysis
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